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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
NO. 97-3473 
 
PAPPAN ENTERPRISES, INC. 
 
v. 
 
HARDEE'S FOOD SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MRO MID-ATLANTIC CORP., 
       Appellants 
 
v. 
 
LOUIS D. PAPPAN; PANAGIOTA PAPPAN 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-01778) 
 
Argued March 12, 1998 
 
Before: BEFORE: STAPLETON and ALITO, Circuit Judges, 
and O'KELLEY,* District Judge 
 
(Opinion Filed May 13, 1998) 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Honorable William C. O'Kelley, United States District Judge for the 
Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation. 
  
       Arthur I. Cantor (Argued) 
       Peter J. Klarfeld 
       Andrew P. Zappia 
       Wiley, Rein & Fielding 
       1776 K Street, N.W. 
       Washington, DC 20006 
        Attorneys for Appellants 
 
       Gene J. Brockland (Argued) 
       Mark R. Dunn 
       Lori F. Kutilek 
       Herzog, Crebs & McGhee, LLP 
       One City Centre, 24th Floor 
       515 North Sixth Street 
       St. Louis, MO 63101 
        Attorneys for Appellees 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
O'KELLEY, Senior District Judge: 
 
Hardee's Food Systems, Inc. ("Hardee's") and MRO Mid- 
Atlantic Corp. ("MRO") appeal from the district court's order 
denying their motion for a preliminary injunction to 
restrain Pappan Enterprises, Inc. ("Pappan") from using the 
ROY ROGERS marks owned by Hardee's and MRO.1 
Because we find that Hardee's and MRO have clearly 
established irreparable injury to their marks from Pappan's 
non-consensual use and that their irreparable injury as a 
result of that use outweighs any injury Pappan might suffer 
from the entry of a preliminary injunction, we will reverse 
the district court and remand with directions to grant the 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
 
I. 
 
Pappan has been a ROY ROGERS franchisee since 
October, 1972. In 1990, MRO acquired the ROY ROGERS 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The ROY ROGERS marks are registered with the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office. Hardee's became the owner of the marks in 1990. 
The marks are now owned by MRO. 
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restaurant system and assumed all of the rights and 
obligations as franchisor under then-existing ROY ROGERS 
franchise agreements. At that time, pursuant to its 
franchise agreements, Pappan operated nineteen (19) ROY 
ROGERS restaurants in the greater Pittsburgh, 
Pennsylvania metropolitan area. Thereafter, Hardee's 
acquired the stock of MRO, and MRO became a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Hardee's. 
 
Between 1990 and 1993, Pappan closed thirteen (13) of 
its ROY ROGERS restaurants and transferred one (1) to a 
third party. Beginning in April, 1993, Pappan ceased 
making royalty and advertising payments on its five (5) 
remaining restaurants as required by the franchise 
agreements. In October 1994, the parties entered into a 
letter agreement ("letter agreement"). The parties agreed 
that Pappan would begin making all required payments 
under its existing franchise agreements on November 1, 
1994, and would remain current on its payments 
thereafter. Further, the parties agreed that with respect to 
any restaurants sold or closed by Pappan by December 31, 
1995, all amounts owed up to November 1, 1994, would be 
forgiven. At Pappan's request, the December 31, 1995, 
deadline was extended to March 31, 1996. 
 
Pappan re-commenced royalty and advertising payments 
on or about November 1, 1994, for its five (5) remaining 
restaurants. In November or December 1995, Pappan again 
ceased making royalty and advertising payments for each of 
the five (5) restaurants. It appears that Pappan has not 
made any of the required payments since that time. 
 
On September 26, 1996, Pappan filed the present action 
alleging breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, negligence, and tortious interference with 
business relations. Pappan contends that Hardee's and 
MRO have mismanaged the ROY ROGERS system and, as 
a result, it has lost significant value. By order dated 
February 20, 1997, the district court dismissed Pappan's 
claims for negligence and tortious interference with 
business relations. 
 
On March 7, 1997, Hardee's and MRO filed their answer 
denying the two (2) remaining claims. Hardee's and MRO 
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also filed a counterclaim for breach of contract based on 
Pappan's failure to pay royalty and advertising fees as 
required by the franchise agreements. As of March 6, 1997, 
Pappan was in arrears as to the five (5) remaining 
restaurants in the amount of $172,038.70. Pursuant to the 
franchise agreements, MRO sent Pappan a Notice of Default 
and Termination regarding the unpaid royalties and 
advertising fees for each store. The notice informed Pappan 
that it had ten (10) days to cure the default or Pappan's five 
(5) remaining franchise agreements would terminate. 
Pappan received the notice on March 10, 1997, but failed to 
cure the default. 
 
By letter dated March 25, 1997, MRO confirmed to 
Pappan that the franchise agreements had terminated on 
March 20, 1997. MRO demanded that Pappan cease using 
the ROY ROGERS marks and comply with the other post- 
termination obligations in the franchise agreements. 
Pappan failed to do so. On April 3, 1997, MRO filed an 
amended counterclaim asserting additional claims arising 
out of the termination of Pappan's franchise agreements, 
including claims for breach of post-termination contractual 
obligations, unjust enrichment, and trademark 
infringement. 
 
On April 25, 1997, Hardee's and MRO moved for a 
preliminary injunction to restrain Pappan's continuing use 
of the ROY ROGERS marks. The district court denied 
Hardee's and MRO's motion, finding that the irreparable 
harm to Pappan from the entry of a preliminary injunction 
outweighed the irreparable harm to Hardee's and MRO from 
the denial of a preliminary injunction. MRO and Hardee's 
filed the instant appeal. Pappan admits that, despite the 
termination of the franchise agreements, it is continuing to 
use the ROY ROGERS marks and to hold itself out to the 
public as a ROY ROGERS franchisee. 
 
II. 
 
"We review the denial of a request for injunctive relief for 
an abuse of discretion." S & R Corp. v. Jiffy Lube Intern., 
Inc., 968 F.2d 371, 374 (3d Cir. 1992)(citing Opticians Ass'n 
of Am. v. Independent Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 
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(3d Cir. 1990)). "A district court abuses its discretion when 
its decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of 
law to fact." Hofkin v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 81 
F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 1995)(citations omitted). This court 
"cannot reverse unless the trial court has committed an 
obvious error in applying the law or a serious mistake in 
considering the proof." Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192 (citing 
Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 
150 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
When ruling on a motion for preliminary injunctive relief, 
a district court must consider four factors: (1) the likelihood 
that plaintiff will prevail on the merits at final hearing; (2) 
the extent to which plaintiff is being irreparably harmed by 
the conduct complained of; (3) the extent to which 
defendant will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary 
injunction is issued; and (4) the public interest. Jiffy Lube, 
968 F.2d at 374 (citing Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 
903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d Cir. 1990)); Opticians, 920 F.2d 
at 191-92 (citing Bill Blass, Ltd. v. Saz Corp., 751 F.2d 152, 
154 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 
The district court determined that the first and second 
factors -- the likelihood that Hardee's and MRO would 
prevail on the merits and irreparable harm to Hardee's and 
MRO as a result of Pappan's continued non-consensual use 
of the ROY ROGERS marks -- weighed in favor of granting 
preliminary injunctive relief. The district court then 
balanced Pappan's irreparable harm against Hardee's and 
MRO's irreparable harm and determined that the balancing 
of hardships weighed against granting preliminary 
injunctive relief. Accordingly, the district court declined to 
consider the fourth factor as all four (4) factors must favor 
the granting of injunctive relief. However, the court then 
noted that the public interest weighed in favor of granting 
preliminary injunctive relief. Report & Recommendation, 11 
n.13. 
 
A. 
 
With respect to the first factor, Hardee's and MRO must 
demonstrate that their claim of damage from unauthorized 
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trademark use is likely to succeed at trial. To prevail on an 
infringement claim under S 32 of the Act, Hardee's and 
MRO must demonstrate that Pappan's use of the ROY 
ROGERS marks was/is unauthorized. Jiffy Lube, 968 F.2d 
at 375 (citing United States Jaycees v. Philadelphia Jaycees, 
639 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1981)). Under S 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act, Hardee's and MRO can demonstrate injury 
from Pappan's use of the ROY ROGERS marks if such use 
is "likely to create confusion concerning the origin of the 
goods or services." Jiffy Lube, 968 F.2d at 375 (citing 
Opticians, 920 F.2d at 192). 
 
"Likelihood of confusion exists when consumers viewing 
the mark would probably assume that the product or 
service it represents is associated with the source of a 
different product or service identified by a similar mark." 
First Keystone Fed. Sav. Bank v. First Keystone Mortgage, 
Inc., 923 F. Supp. 693, 703-04 (E.D. Pa. 1996)(citing Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d 
Cir. 1994)). This court has held that where the identical 
mark is used concurrently by unrelated entities, the 
likelihood of confusion is inevitable. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 
195; United States Jaycees, 639 F.2d at 142. It appears to 
be undisputed that Pappan is continuing to use the ROY 
ROGERS marks. The district court determined that such 
use created a likelihood of confusion among consumers 
concerning the origin of the goods and services. Report & 
Recommendation, 4. Accordingly, the district court found 
that the first factor -- the likelihood that Hardee's and MRO 
will prevail on the merits -- weighed in favor of granting 
preliminary injunctive relief. We agree. 
 
Pappan disputes the district court's determination and 
alleges several Lanham Act defenses. 15 U.S.C. S 1115(b). 
Pappan asserts that these defenses render the likelihood 
that Hardee's and MRO will prevail on the merits 
speculative. If a defendant prevails on one of the statutory 
defenses in a trademark infringement case, "the plaintiff 
loses the presumption of validity, ownership and right to 
protection." First Keystone, 923 F. Supp. at 701 (citing Ford 
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 939, 112 S.Ct. 373, 116 L.E.2d 
324 (1991)). Pappan asserts that the doctrines of laches 
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and acquiescence apply in this case and preclude a finding 
that Hardee's and MRO are likely to prevail on the merits 
of their infringement claim. The district court considered 
Pappan's statutory defenses and determined that neither 
laches nor acquiescence was a viable defense to Hardee's 
and MRO's infringement claim. 
 
Laches is an equitable doctrine that prevents recovery 
when a defendant can show inexcusable delay in instituting 
suit and prejudice to the defendant resulting from such 
delay. First Keystone, 923 F. Supp. at 701 (citing University 
of Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087, 103 S.Ct. 571, 74 
L.E.2d 933 (1982)). The doctrine of acquiescence applies 
when the trademark owner, by affirmative word or deed, 
conveys its implied consent to another. 4 McCarthy On 
Trademarks and Unfair Competition, S 31.51 at 31-76 (4th 
ed. 1997). The facts of this case show that Hardee's and 
MRO sought a preliminary injunction one (1) month after 
the franchises were terminated. 
 
Pappan asserts that the relevant time period in 
considering Hardee's and MRO's delay is the fifteen (15) 
month period during which Pappan was failing to pay the 
required royalty and advertising payments while continuing 
to use the ROY ROGERS marks. As the district court held, 
however, Pappan did not begin infringing on the ROY 
ROGERS marks until Hardee's and MRO terminated 
Pappan's franchise agreements. Until that time, Hardee's 
and MRO had no basis upon which to seek an injunction, 
and their failure to do so does not constitute delay. 
 
Similarly, Pappan argues that Hardee's and MRO 
consented to Pappan's trademark infringement when they 
continued to do business with Pappan after Pappan began 
defaulting on its required fees in late 1995. But Pappan 
again confuses the relevant time period; Pappan did not 
begin infringing upon Hardee's and MRO's trademark until 
March 20, 1997. There is no evidence that Hardee's and 
MRO continued to do business with Pappan after this date. 
 
Accordingly, the district court determined that the 
doctrines of laches and acquiescence were not applicable in 
that there was no unreasonable delay in applying for relief. 
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Report & Recommendation, 7. We agree and uphold the 
district court's ruling on the issue of Hardee's and MRO's 
likelihood of success on the merits without further 
discussion. 
 
B. 
 
The second factor a court must consider before granting 
preliminary injunctive relief is the extent to which plaintiff 
will suffer irreparable injury if preliminary injunctive relief 
is denied. Grounds for irreparable injury include loss of 
control of reputation, loss of trade, and loss of goodwill. 
Opticians, 920 F.2d at 195. Irreparable injury can also be 
based upon the possibility of confusion. Id. at 196. This 
court has held that once the likelihood of confusion caused 
by trademark infringement has been established, the 
inescapable conclusion is that there was also irreparable 
injury. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 196-97 (citations omitted). 
 
The district court found that Hardee's and MRO had 
shown irreparable injury given that the court had 
previously found that the likelihood of confusion was 
inevitable because the identical trademark was being used 
simultaneously by both Pappan and MRO. Accordingly, the 
district court determined that the second factor weighed in 
favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. Report & 
Recommendation, 9. 
 
C. 
 
The third factor a district court must consider before 
granting preliminary injunctive relief is the harm defendant 
might suffer should the relief be granted. In considering 
this harm, the district court must undertake to balance the 
hardships to the respective parties. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 
197. The court must "ensure that the issuance of an 
injunction would not harm the infringer more than a denial 
would harm the mark's owner." Id. 
 
The district court found that Pappan would suffer 
irreparable injury should it be enjoined from using the ROY 
ROGERS marks. Report & Recommendation, 9. In support 
of this finding, the district court noted that Pappan had 
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continued to invest money in the restaurants, including 
several months of logoed product, and had continued to 
build up the goodwill of its customers. Id. The district court 
then balanced the hardships to the parties and found in 
favor of Pappan. 
 
The district court determined that Hardee's and MRO had 
failed to specify in what manner they had been harmed. 
The district court also found that Hardee's and MRO had 
demonstrated a lack of interest in the ROY ROGERS system 
for years. The district court stated: 
 
       Hardee's and MRO's apparent efforts to disengage 
       themselves from the Roy Rogers system does not 
       suggest that they will suffer greater harm than Pappan 
       if the injunction is denied. Moreover, it was largely 
       because of [Hardee's and MRO's] failure to take any 
       action to terminate Pappan's franchises for fifteen 
       months knowing that it was not receiving their royalty 
       payments and advertising fees and their willingness to 
       forgive past due fees that Pappan continued to invest 
       monies into its restaurants. Under these 
       circumstances, it does not appear that the hardship 
       suffered by [Hardee's and MRO] at this juncture 
       outweighs the harm which would befall Pappan should 
       we grant the requested relief. 
 
Report & Recommendation, 10. This finding by the district 
court constitutes clear error, and we now reverse. 
 
The district court's determination that Hardee's and MRO 
failed to specify in what manner they had been injured is 
unsupported by the record. The district court found, and 
we agree, that Hardee's and MRO have clearly 
demonstrated irreparable injury as a result of Pappan's 
non-consensual use of the ROY ROGERS marks in the 
forms of loss of control of reputation and the inevitable 
likelihood of confusion to consumers. Pappan, on the other 
hand, has failed to demonstrate irreparable injury. 
Moreover, any difficulties Pappan now faces were brought 
on by its own conduct in continuing to use the ROY 
ROGERS marks despite the termination of the franchise 
agreements. 
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Irreparable harm "must be of a peculiar nature, so that 
compensation in money alone cannot atone for it." 
Opticians, 920 F.2d at 195 (citing Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 
364, 372 (3d Cir. 1987)). The district court found that 
Pappan would suffer significant financial injuries should 
the injunction issue, including several months worth of 
logoed product. The district court, however, did not set 
forth what alleged injuries Pappan would suffer that could 
not be remedied by money damages. Pappan argues that it 
would suffer the loss of its customers' goodwill if it were 
forced to convert to a non-affiliated restaurant and then to 
another chain shortly thereafter. However, the portion of 
the case cited by Pappan in support of this argument 
addresses the injuries of the party whose mark is being 
infringed. Opticians, 920 F.2d at 195. The concept of 
customers' goodwill in the context of trademark law is 
goodwill for the mark, not for the specific restaurant. 
 
The self-inflicted nature of any harm suffered by Pappan 
also weighs in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. 
This court held in Jiffy Lube and Opticians that a party's 
self-inflicted harm by choosing to stop its own performance 
under the contract and thus effectively terminating the 
agreement is outweighed by the immeasurable damage 
done to the franchisor of the mark. Jiffy Lube, 968 F.2d at 
379; Opticicans, 902 F.2d at 197. Lastly, Mr. Demetrios 
Pappan, President of Pappan Enterprises, Inc., stated in his 
affidavit dated June 9, 1997, that "Pappan could stop using 
the ROY ROGERS marks in the next four to six months 
without being harmed, ... ." Affidavit of Demetrios Pappan, 
P 8. Accordingly, it does not appear that Pappan will suffer 
irreparable harm should the preliminary injunction issue. 
 
In balancing the hardships to the parties, we believe that 
any injury Pappan might suffer as a result of the issuance 
of a preliminary injunction is outweighed by the irreparable 
harm Hardee's and MRO would continue to suffer as a 
result of Pappan's non-consensual use of the ROY ROGERS 
marks. Pappan argues that the district court was correct in 
finding that because Hardee's and MRO had demonstrated 
a lack of interest in the ROY ROGERS system for years, any 
injury they might suffer as a result of Pappan's continued 
use of the marks was minimal. Pappan further argues that 
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Hardee's and MRO's alleged injury is self-inflicted, resulting 
from Hardee's and MRO's failure to fulfill their obligations 
under the franchise agreements. 
 
We first note that Pappan is not arguing that Hardee's 
and MRO have abandoned the ROY ROGERS marks. 
Appellee's Brief, 22-23. Pappan instead appears to argue 
that because Hardee's and MRO have reduced the number 
of ROY ROGERS franchisees, they have demonstrated a 
lack of interest in the ROY ROGERS system and thus 
Pappan's continued unauthorized use of the ROY ROGERS 
marks will cause them little harm. Courts have recognized 
that a trademark owner's decision to reduce the size of its 
business or to cease operations alone does not undermine 
the owner's legal right to enforce and protect its trademark. 
See Defiance Button Machine Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. 
Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1061 (2d Cir.), cert . denied, 474 U.S. 
844, 106 S.Ct. 131, 88 L.Ed.2d 108 (1985); Berni v. Int'l 
Gourmet Restaurants of Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 646 (2d 
Cir. 1988). Moreover, Hardee's and MRO have clearly 
established irreparable injury. 
 
With respect to Pappan's argument that Hardee's and 
MRO's injury is self-inflicted and thus precludes the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction, the courtfinds 
Pappan's argument to be without merit. Pappan's non- 
consensual use of the ROY ROGERS marks is the direct 
cause of Hardee's and MRO's irreparable injury. Pappan 
argues that Hardee's and MRO's injury is self-inflicted due 
to their failure to fulfill their contractual obligations to 
Pappan. In other words, Pappan argues that because 
Hardee's and MRO have failed to fulfill their contractual 
obligations, Pappan has been forced to continue using the 
ROY ROGERS marks following termination of the franchise 
agreements. 
 
"Under basic contract principles, when one party to a 
contract feels that the other contracting party has breached 
its agreement, the non-breaching party may either stop 
performance and assume the contract is avoided, or 
continue its performance and sue for damages. Under no 
circumstances may the non-breaching party stop 
performance and continue to take advantage of the 
contract's benefits." Jiffy Lube, 968 F.2d at 376. In Jiffy 
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Lube, this court followed several other courts in applying 
this law to franchise termination disputes. This court held 
that "[w]here the franchise agreement gives the franchisor 
the power to unilaterally terminate the agreement under 
certain conditions, and those conditions exist, pre- 
termination complaints are not relevant to infringement 
under the Lanham Act. Rather, pre-termination disputes 
affect the issue of damages." Id. at 377. We believe that 
Hardee's and MRO's irreparable injury is not self-inflicted. 
 
Accordingly, the balancing of the parties' hardships 
weighs in favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. 
 
D. 
 
Lastly, a district court must consider whether the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction serves the public 
interest before granting preliminary injunctive relief. "Public 
interest can be defined a number of ways, but in a 
trademark case, it is most often a synonym for the right of 
the public not to be deceived or confused." Opticians, 920 
F.2d at 197. The district court found that Pappan's use of 
the ROY ROGERS mark is likely to create confusion. The 
district court then determined that this finding mandated a 
finding that the public interest would be damaged if Pappan 
is permitted to continue using the mark. We agree and find 
that the district court did not err in finding that the public 
interest weighed in favor of granting preliminary injunctive 
relief. 
 
Pappan argues that the public interest does not weigh in 
favor of granting preliminary injunctive relief. Pappan cites 
no law in support of its position. In addition, Pappan 
asserts that the district court did not actually find that the 
public interest weighed in favor of granting the relief 
because the order stated that the court was not addressing 
that issue. The court did, however, address the issue of 
public interest. Report & Recommendation, 11 n.13. 
Pappan's arguments regarding the public interest do not 
merit further discussion. 
 
III. 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the 
district court clearly erred in denying Hardee's and MRO's 
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motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court's 
order denying Hardee's and MRO's motion for a preliminary 
injunction is hereby reversed. This case is hereby remanded 
to the district court with instructions to grant Hardee's and 
MRO's motion for a preliminary injunction. 
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